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Abstract
We develop here the Stochastic Perron Method in the framework of two-player zero-sum dif-
ferential games. We consider the formulation of the game where both players play, symmetrically,
feed-back strategies (as in [CR09] and [PZ12]) as opposed to the Elliott-Kalton formulation preva-
lent in the literature. The class of feed-back strategies we use is carefully chosen so that the state
equation admits strong solutions and the technicalities involved in the Stochastic Perron Method
carry through in a rather simple way. More precisely, we define the game over elementary strate-
gies, which are well motivated by intuition. Within this framework, the Stochastic Perron Method
produces a viscosity sub-solution of the upper Isaacs equation dominating the upper value of the
game, and a viscosity super-solution of the upper Isaacs equation lying below the upper value of
the game. Using a viscosity comparison result we obtain that the upper value is the unique and
continuous viscosity solution of the upper Isaacs equation. An identical statement holds true for
the lower value and the lower Isaacs equation. A version of the Dynamic Programming Principle is
obtained as a by-product. If the Isaacs condition is satisfied, the game has a value over elementary
(pure) strategies.
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1 Introduction
Continuous time games have been an active research area since the pioneering work of Isaacs [Isa65]. In
[EK72], Elliott and Kalton studied a deterministic differential game, where one player (using strate-
gies) observes continuously the actions of the other players, who plays open loop controls. This
formulation of the game has been considered for the first time in stochastic framework in [FS89]. The
viscosity solution approach previously used in deterministic setting turns out to be quite involved here,
and, actually, one cannot prove the dynamic programming principle working directly with the value
functions (see [FS89] or [Kat95]).
A different approach, resembling verification for classical solutions but in the context of non-smooth
viscosity solutions, was employed in [S´wi96a] and [S´wi96b] (first for deterministic problems and then
for zero-sum stochastic games in Elliott-Kalton formulation). There, it was proven (using inf/sup
convolution regularization of viscosity solutions in the spirit of [LS85] and an approximation of the
state equation by non-degenerate diffusions) that viscosity sub/super-solutions satisfy the correspond-
ing half of the DPP (so called sub/super-optimality conditions), therefore comparing to the value
function. The unique continuous viscosity solution (obtained separately by PDE methods, most likely
by Perron’s method for viscosity solutions introduced in [Ish87]) is equal to the value function(s) and
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the DPP is satisfied. In order to regularize the diffusion, the probability space needs to be enlarged to
accommodate an independent Brownian Motion. This means that verification is actually performed
for a slightly different game, not the one in the original formulation. Similar technical arguments to
prove DPP for games in Elliott-Kalton formulation were used very recently in [Kry13a] and [Kry13b]
for non-degenerate diffusions, but with only measurable in space coefficients.
Out of the existing literature on games, most papers (all above) use the Elliott-Kalton formulation
previously mentioned, where one player uses controls and the other uses strategies. This asymmetric
formulation produces two values of the game that do not compare by definition, as one would expect.
It seems more natural to consider a symmetric formulation of the game. One way to do this, is to
consider, for both players, strategies which are based only on the knowledge of the past of the state.
Each player’s actions are responses to the other player’s actions through the use of such feed-back
strategies. Feed-back strategies have already been used in both one-player (control) problems (see
the notion of natural controls in [Kry09]) and in (discretized) zero-sum deterministic games (under
the name of positional/historical strategies, and used by one or both players) in [KS88]. From the
recent literature on stochastic games, [CR09] consider a game in the strong formulation over feed-back
strategies with delay, but even allow for some mixing, and [PZ12] use discretized feed-back strategies
(under the name of feed-back controls borrowed from the more classical control literature). In the
weak formulation of a non-Markovian game over feed-back strategies, [PZ12] use BSDE’s techniques
to conclude that the values of the games are solutions to the path-dependent Isaacs equations. This
work follows a long line of interesting results relating BSDEs to stochastic games in Elliott-Kalton
formulation: [HL95], [EKH03] or [BL08], to name just a few.
We provide here a novel tool to study continuous-time zero-sum stochastic differential games, in
an (arguably) more natural formulation. The aim of the current paper is two-fold:
1. to consider a symmetric formulation of the stochastic game over a (restricted class of) feed-back
strategies that yield strong solutions to the state equations. The restriction is quite different,
and (we believe) more natural than the delay in [CR09] or the deterministic time-discretization
in [KS88] and [PZ12]. We find it conceptually important to have a class of strategies where the
state is a one-to-one response to the (unobserved) noise, once both players have decided on what
strategies will be used,
2. to show that the Stochastic Perron Method (introduced in [BS12] for linear problems, later for
Dynkin games in [BS14] and for control problems in [BS13]) can be adapted to differential games
in the above formulation. This amounts to a new method to study games, and actually turns
out to be rather elementary compared to the existing work.
In order to illustrate our approach, we impose some restrictive conditions on the controlled stochastic
system, rather than consider the most general framework. More precisely: the state space is the
whole Rd, the state equation is uniformly locally Lipschitz in the state variable, the terminal pay-off
is bounded, the controls live in some compact spaces, etc. It is well known from [FS89] that stochastic
games are non-trivial even with (more) restrictive assumptions, as the strategic nature of the problem
remains intact. We also consider only a terminal pay-off, but running cost can be easily added.
However, we allow for the state equation to be degenerate, so one cannot expect any smoothness of
solutions to the Bellman-Isaacs equation(s).
The method we present here amounts to a verification result for non-smooth viscosity solutions.
The Stochastic Perron construction and viscosity comparison show that the value function(s) is the
unique viscosity solution of the Bellman-Isaacs equation(s) and that (a version of) the DPP holds.
Aside from the symmetric definition of the game over feed-back strategies, our verification program
is conceptually different from the verification arguments in [S´wi96a], [S´wi96b]. We work directly with
the state equation and the original definition of the game. Our approach does not approximate the
state equation by more regular diffusions so we have a verification argument for the original (strong)
definition of the game on the initially chosen physical space that does not need to accommodate
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an additional independent Brownian motion. Technically, the Stochastic Perron method is rather
elementary and is based only on how we define the stochastic semi-solutions, the well known definition
of viscosity solutions and Itoˆ’s Lemma. Our verification is completed by a comparison argument that
has to be proved analytically and separately anyway (here and in other existing approaches).
2 Stochastic Differential Games and Strategies
2.1 The Stochastic System
We consider a stochastic differential game with two players. The first player’s actions belong to a
compact metric space (U, du) (usually U ⊂ R
k). The second player’s actions belong also to a compact
metric space (V, dv) (usually V ⊂ R
l). We assume that the state lives in the whole space Rd (but one
could also consider a natural open domain O ⊂ Rd as in [BS13]). Let b : [0, T ] × Rd × U × V → Rd
and σ : [0, T ] × Rd × U × V →Md,d′ be two continuous functions. We consider the diffusion{
dXt = b(t,Xt, ut, vt)dt+ σ(t,Xt, ut, vt)dWt,
Xs = x ∈ R
d,
(1)
starting at an initial time s at some position x, and which is controlled by both players. Here, W
is a d′-dimensional Brownian motion on a fixed probability space (Ω,F ,P). We intend to pose the
problem in such a way that the state equation will admit strong solutions. Therefore, is is natural to
assume that, for the initial time s, the filtration considered is Fs = (Fst )s≤t≤T , the augmented natural
filtration generated by the Brownian increments starting at s, by which we mean.
Fst = σ(Wu −Ws, s ≤ u ≤ t) ∨ N (P,F) for s ≤ t ≤ T.
However, any larger filtration that keeps W· −Ws a Brownian motion starting at s and satisfying the
usual conditions is also fine. Now, given a bounded and continuous function g : Rd → R, the second
player pays to the first player the amount E[g(Xs,x;u,vT )]. This leads to a zero-sum game of the form
sup
u
inf
v
E[g(Xs,x;u,vT )], infv
sup
u
E[g(Xs,x;u,vT )].
Just for the sake of presentation, we have assumed that no running cost is present, as in [BS13]. Such
cost can easily be added. The lower and the upper Hamiltonians are defined by
H−(t, x, p,M) := sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
[
b(t, x, u, v) · p+
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, u, v)σ(t, x, u, v)TM
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Rd,
H+(t, x, p,M) := inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
[
b(t, x, u, v) · p+
1
2
Tr
(
σ(t, x, u, v)σ(t, x, u, v)TM
)]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Rd.
We associate, formally for the moment, the following Isaacs equations to the game{
−vt −H
i(t, x, vx, vxx) = 0 on [0, T ) × R
d,
v(T, ·) = g(·), on Rd.
(2)
For i = − we have the lower Isaacs equation, and for i = + we have the upper Isaacs equation.
We make the standing assumption that that the coefficients b, σ of the stochastic system are jointly
continuous, satisfy a uniform local Lipschitz condition in x, i.e.
(L) |b(t, x, u, v) − b(t, y, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v) − σ(t, y, u, v)| ≤ L(K)|x− y|
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∀ |x|, |y| ≤ K, t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U, v ∈ V for some L(K) < ∞, and also satisfy a global linear growth
condition in x
(LG) |b(t, x, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)
∀ |x|, |y| ∈ Rd, t ∈ [0, T ], u ∈ U, v ∈ V for some C < ∞. Under these assumptions, if both players
choose to hold a constant strategy, the controlled state has a unique solution. This holds true even if
the game is started at a random (but stopping) time sequel to the starting time s, and the constant
strategies depend on whatever happened before the starting time. More precisely, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.1 Let s ≤ τ ′ ≤ T be a stopping time with respect to the filtration Fs = (Fst )s≤t≤T . Let
ξ ∈ Rd, a ∈ U, b ∈ V, be random variables measurable with respect to Fsτ ′ . Then, the system starting at
time τ ′ with initial condition ξ, where both players choose constant strategies a, b in between τ ′ and T
has a (path-wise) unique strong solution. In other words, the SDE{
dXt = b(t,Xt, a, b)dt + σ(t,Xt, a, b)dWt, τ
′ ≤ t ≤ T
Xτ ′ = ξ
(3)
has a unique strong solution (Xt)τ ′≤t≤T . If ξ is square integrable, the solution is square integrable as
well.
Proof: the arguments are standard, so we omit the details. The path-wise (or strong) uniqueness is
proved by localization and Gronwall. Using again localization and then a Picard iteration, we prove
the existence of a saturated strong solution, up to some explosion time. The global growth condition
and Gronwall inequality insure that there is actually no explosion. ⋄
2.2 Elementary Strategies
So far, the game is defined formally. To have a consistent mathematical definition, we need to define
some non-constant strategies for each player. In our model both players observe continuously the
state process (which is a response to both players actions) but not the noise, and both players play
(symmetrically) strategies based on the information available. This leads to a formulation of the game
where the upper and the lower values compare by definition, as in in [CR09] and, more recently, in
[PZ12]. In other words, we propose for use as strategies, by both players:
1. functionals of the past of the state (pure feed-back strategies), if one expects the game to have a
value. This is the case in [CR09] (with delay) and [PZ12] (for the weak formulation), following
the older work [KS88] on deterministic games, where feed-back strategies were discretized with
respect to time,
2. strategies as above, but mixed (at each time), if the game over pure strategies as above does not
have a value. Some mixing is actually allowed in [CR09] and is also used in [KS88] for the case
of deterministic games.
In other words, we believe that the game should be first formulated over such pure (feed-back) strate-
gies and, if the lower and upper values are not equal, then one should proceed directly to considering
mixed strategies where the game is expected to have a value. For mathematical reasons, we treat in
the present paper the complete picture of the game over pure strategies. More precisely, we study
separately the two value functions as solutions of the two Isaacs equations. If the Isaacs condition
is satisfied, then, obviously, the game is expected to have a value over pure strategies. We defer the
study of elementary mixed strategies in the absence of Isaacs condition to forthcoming work [S1ˆ3].
We do not assume any delay as in [CR09] for two reasons: such strategies don’t work well with
Stochastic Perron’s Method and, conceptually, we find it harder to justify delaying the information
available, while, at the same time, continuously changing actions. Some other natural restriction
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has still to be imposed on the feed-back strategies, so that, once each player chooses a strategy, the
state equation has a unique strong solution. Despite the fact the noise is unobserved, we believe it is
conceptually important for the state equation to have a unique strong solution over pure strategies. In
addition, our so called Elementary Strategies that we propose below, are exactly the kind of strategies
that one can expect to enforce in a continuous-time game, where changing actions continuously may
not be completely feasible, but when a change is made, the information available should not be delayed
and only used later. The Elementary Strategies are defined in a very similar manner to how one defines
Elementary Integrands in stochastic integration, but on the state path space.
To simplify notation, for the remainder of the paper, fixed a starting time s, we denote by
C([s, T ]) , C([s, T ],Rd) and endow this path space with the natural (and raw) filtration Bs =
(Bst )s≤t≤T defined by
Bst , σ(y(u), s ≤ u ≤ t), s ≤ t ≤ T.
The elements of the path space C([s, T ]) will be, usually, denoted by y(·) or y, when there is no risk of
confusion. The stopping times on the space C([s, T ]) with respect with the filtration Bs, i.e. mappings
τ : C([s, T ]) → [s, T ] satisfying {τ ≤ t} ∈ Bst ∀ s ≤ t ≤ T are called stopping rules, following [KS01].
We denote by Bs the class of such stopping rules starting at s.
Definition 2.2 (Elementary Pure Strategies) Fix 0 ≤ s ≤ T . An elementary strategy u starting
at s, for the first player, is defined by
• a finite non-decreasing sequence of stopping rules, i.e. τk ∈ B
s for k = 1, . . . , n and
s = τ0 ≤ . . . τk ≤ · · · ≤ τn = T
• for each k = 1 . . . n, a constant value of the strategy ξk in between the times τk−1 and τk, which
is decided based only on the knowledge of the past state up to τk−1, i.e. ξk : C([s, T ])→ U such
that ξk ∈ B
s
τk−1
.
The strategy is to hold ξk in between (τk−1, τk], i.e. u : (s, T ]× C([s, T ])→ U is defined by
u(t, y(·)) ,
n∑
k=1
ξk(y(·))1{τk−1(y(·))<t≤τk(y(·))}.
Such a strategy can be denoted, when there is no risk of confusion, also as u = (ξk, τk)k=1,n. An
elementary strategy v for the second player is defined in an identical way, but takes values in V . We
denote by U(s, s) and V(s, s) the collections of all possible elementary strategies for the first, and the
second player, given the initial deterministic time s.
The timings τk of changing the controls in the definition of strategies, are exactly the ”stopping rules”
considered in the game of stopping and control in [KS01]. In addition, we would like to point out that,
since ξ1 ∈ B
s
s, this means that ξ1(·) = l(y(s)), for some measurable function l : R
d → U. It is obvious
that, for a simple strategy, the representation u = (ξk, τk)k=1,n is not unique.
Remark 2.3 The elementary strategies are obviously non-anticipative functionals of the paths of X
but they are neither
1. Lipschitz with respect to the sup norm on the path-space (this allows for great flexibility in
pursuing Stochastic Perron)
2. nor delayed strategies as considered in [CR09]
Lipschitz functionals of the path are good strategies to define the values of the game (resulting in strong
solutions of the state equation, with the very strong additional Lipschitz assumption of coefficients)
but hard to fit in the framework of Stochastic Perron we develop here. In addition, we believe that our
”discrete-time” strategies are easier to justify in applications.
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Fortunately, the strategies we just defined still produce strong solutions of the state equation without
any Lipschitz assumption in u, v. More precisely, iterating Proposition 2.1, we get
Proposition 2.4 Fix s, x and let players one and two choose strategies u ∈ U(s, s) and v ∈ V(s, s).
Then, there exists a unique strong (and square integrable) solution (Xs,x;u,vt )s≤t≤T of the state equation{
dXt = b(t,Xt, u(t,X·), v(t,X·)dt+ σ(t,Xt, u(t,X·), v(t,X·)) dWt, s ≤ t ≤ T
Xs = x ∈ R
d.
(4)
Uniqueness holds in the path-wise sense.
The proof of the above proposition is based on iterating Proposition 2.1 together with the following
very simple but useful lemma:
Lemma 2.5 Fix s and let τ be a stopping rule, τ : C([s, T ]) → [s, T ], τ ∈ Bs. Let (Xt)s≤t≤T be a
process with continuous (all, not only almost surely) paths, which is adapted to Fs. Then, the random
time τX : Ω → [s, T ] defined by τX(ω) , τ(X·(ω)) is a stopping time w.r.to the filtration F
s. In
addition XτX ∈ F
s
τX
.
Remark 2.6 In one-player (control) problems, the use of open-loop controls yields strong solutions of
the state equation (because of the Lipschitz condition in the standing assumptions). Something similar
would happen if one defined the game over open-loop controls, but this formulation is not appropriate
for games. In the Elliott-Kalton formulation of [FS89], where one player chooses open-loop controls
and the other strategies, again, existence of strong solutions of the state equation is easily checked.
Once feed-back strategies are allowed (actually for both players), the existence of strong solutions is
non-trivial. One can, therefore, either restrict strategies, as in [CR09] in order to have a strong
formulation, or consider a weak formulation as in [PZ12] (but restriction are needed even in the
weak formulation). We choose here the strong formulation, and restrict the strategies to the class of
elementary strategies. The restriction to the class of elementary strategies is meaningful both at the
modeling level (actions can only be changed discretely in time) and at the level of the mathematics (we
need the state equation to be well posed).
We now formulate the game rigorously. For fixed 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ Rd (deterministic), we define
the lower and the upper value of the game
V −(s, x) , sup
u∈U(s,s)
inf
v∈V(s,s)
E[g(Xs,x:u,vT )] ≤ inf
v∈V(s,s)
sup
u∈U(s,s)
E[g(Xs,x;u,vT )] , V
+(s, x).
Since both our players play strategies (symmetrically), the lower and the upper values compare by
definition. This feature has already been emphasized in the literature, like [CR09] or [PZ12], in
opposition to the Elliott-Kalton formulation in [FS89]. A finite valued version of feed-back strategies
is present in [PZ12] for technical reasons, but the discretization is over deterministic times, and the
game is considered in weak formulation. Our strategies are actually not finitely valued: they are
discrete only in time. The discretization over deterministic times in [PZ12] is also reminiscent of
the classic work [Nis88], where the author uses a fixed time grid and then passes to the limit using
semi-group techniques.
The lower value of the game has the meaning that player 1 announces his/her full strategy to player
2, who chooses a strategy accordingly. Symmetrically for the upper value. Of course, something like
this does not really happen, so, if the two values differ, one should just consider mixed strategies.
However, we do analyze the two possibly different values for mathematical reasons. Assume for a
moment, that, player 2, indeed, knows the full strategy that player 1 is going to use. If that is the
case, since both players’ strategies are non-anticipative functionals of the path, conceptually, this
would correspond exactly to the Elliott-Kalton idea that player 2 observes continuously player’s 1
controls. It is, therefore, not surprising that we expect such lower value and upper value, to be the
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solutions to the corresponding Isaacs equation. However, such a heuristic statement needs a proof,
and part of our contribution is to provide such proof.
We also need need to define strategies starting at sequel times to the initial (deterministic) time
s. The starting time is a stopping rule.
Definition 2.7 (Elementary Strategies starting later) Fix s and let τ ∈ Bs be a stopping rule.
An elementary strategy, denoted by u ∈ U(s, τ), for the first player, starting at τ , is defined by
• (again) a finite non-decreasing sequence of stopping rules, i.e. τk ∈ B
s, k = 1, . . . n for some
finite n, and with τ = τ0 ≤ . . . τk ≤ · · · ≤ τn = T.
• for each k = 1 . . . n, a constant action ξk in between the times τk−1 and τk, which is decided based
only on the knowledge of the past state up τk−1, i.e. ξk : C([s, T ])→ U such that ξk ∈ B
s
τk−1
.
The strategy is, again, to hold ξk in between (τk−1, τk], i.e..
u : {(t, y)|τ(y) < t ≤ T, y ∈ C([s, T ])} → U with u(t, y(·)) ,
n∑
k=1
ξk(y(·))1{τk−1(y(·))<t≤τk(y(·))}.
We define similarly V(s, τ) for the second player.
It is clear that, if we consider τ = s in the Definition 2.7 of U(s, τ), we obtain the same thing as U(s, s)
in Definition 2.2, so the notation is consistent. The same holds true for V. The classes of strategies
U(s, τ) and V(s, τ) are, obviously, not closed in any reasonable sense, but they are robust. The two
results below have very simple proofs, which we omit.
Lemma 2.8 Let u1, u2 ∈ U(s, τ) for some s ≤ T and τ ∈ B
s. Let A ⊂ C([s, T ] such that A ∈ Bsτ .
Then, the mapping u : (s, T ]× C([s, T ])→ U defined by
u(t, y) = 1{y∈A}u1(t, y) + 1{y∈Ac}u2(t, y),
is an elementary strategy in U(s, τ). An identical statement holds for the second player.
Strategies in U(s, τ) or V(s, τ) cannot be used by themselves for the game starting at s, but have to
be concatenated with other strategies.
Proposition 2.9 (Concatenated elementary strategies) Fix s and let τ ∈ Bs be a stopping rule
and u˜ ∈ U(s, τ). Then, for each u ∈ U(s, s), the mapping u⊗τ u˜ : (s, T ]× C([s, T ])→ U defined by(
u⊗τ u˜
)
(t, y(·)) , u(t, y(·))1{s<t≤τ(y(·))} + u˜(t, y(·))1{τ(y(·))<t≤T}
is a simple strategy starting at s, i.e. u⊗τ u˜ ∈ U(s, s). A similar statement holds for the second player.
3 Stochastic Perron’s Method
Having defined elementary strategies, and the concatenation, we are now in position to define stochastic
semi-solutions of the two Isaacs equations.
Definition 3.1 (Stochastic Super-Solution of Upper Isaacs) A function w : [0, T ]×Rd → R is
called a stochastic super-solution of the upper Isaacs equation if
1. it is bounded, continuous and w(T, ·) ≥ g(·),
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2. for each s and for each stopping rule τ : C([s, T ]) → [s, T ], τ ∈ Bs there exists an elementary
strategy v˜ ∈ V(s, τ) such that, for any u ∈ U(s, s), any v ∈ V(s, s), any x ∈ Rd and each stopping
rule ρ ∈ Bs, τ ≤ ρ ≤ T , with the simplifying notation X , Xs,x,u,v⊗τ v˜ and (see Lemma 2.5)
τ ′ , τ(X), ρ′ , ρ(X), we have
w(τ ′,Xτ ′) ≥ E[w(ρ
′,Xρ′)|F
s
τ ′ ] P− a.s.
Choosing τ = s, we can see that, if w is a stochastic super-solution, there exists v˜ ∈ V(s, s) such that
w(s, x) ≥ E
[
w(ρ(Xs,x,u,v˜· ),X
s,x,u,v˜
ρ(Xs,x,u,v˜· )
)|Fss
]
, P− a.s
for all u ∈ U(s, s) and ρ ∈ Bs. After taking the expectation, it is now obvious that, if w is a stochastic
super-solution, then we have the half DPP for w, i.e.
w(s, x) ≥ inf
v∈V(s,s)
sup
u∈U(s,s)
E
[
w(ρ(Xs,x,u,v· ),X
s,x,u,v
ρ(Xs,x,u,v· )
)
]
, ∀ρ ∈ Bs. (5)
Since w(T, ·) ≥ g(·), we obtain easily that w(s, x) ≥ V +(s, x). Compared to the Elliott-Kalton formu-
lation prevalent in the literature, we have here a game where both players use elementary feed-back
strategies. Also, in (5), stopping rules are considered instead of stopping times. Therefore, even if
one tried to enlarge the probability space to accommodate an independent Brownian motion, it is not
clear if the non-trivial approximation arguments in [S´wi96b] could be reproduced to conclude that the
super-optimality principle (5) is equivalent to the notion of viscosity super-solution of upper Isaacs
equation. However, instead of following this direction, we circumvent most difficulties using the more
elementary Stochastic Perron Method, which means taking the infimum of stochastic super-solutions.
The stochastic sub-solutions of the lower Isaacs equation are defined symmetrically, in an obvious
way.
Definition 3.2 (Stochastic Sub-Solution of Lower Isaacs) A function w : [0, T ] × Rd → R is
called a stochastic sub-solution of the lower Isaacs equation if
1. it is bounded, continuous and w(T, ·) ≤ g(·),
2. for each s and for each stopping rule τ ∈ Bs there exists an elementary strategy u˜ ∈ U(s, τ) such
that, for any u ∈ U(s, s), any v ∈ V(s, s), any x and each stopping rule ρ ∈ Bs, τ ≤ ρ ≤ T , with
the simplifying notation X , Xs,x,u⊗τ u˜,v and τ ′ , τ(X), ρ′ , ρ(X), we have
w(τ ′,Xτ ′) ≤ E[w(ρ
′,Xρ′)|F
s
τ ′ ] P− a.s.
It is another easy observation that, a stochastic sub-solution of the lower Isaacs equation satisfies
w ≤ V − and the corresponding half DPP/sub-optimality principle. The two definitions above are
perfectly symmetric, and they would be enough to proceed with Stochastic Perron, in case the Isaacs
condition holds. For the general case we study here we need to also define:
Definition 3.3 (Stochastic Sub-Solution of Upper Isaacs) A function w : [0, T ] × Rd → R is
called a stochastic sub-solution of the upper Isaacs equation if
1. it is bounded, continuous and w(T, ·) ≤ g(·),
2. for each s and for each stopping rule τ : C([s, T ] → [s, T ], τ ∈ Bs and each strategy v ∈ V(s, s)
there exists an elementary strategy u˜ ∈ U(s, τ) (depending on v and τ) such that, for any
u ∈ U(s, s) and any x as well as each stopping rule ρ ∈ Bs, τ ≤ ρ ≤ T , with the simplifying
notation X , Xs,x,u⊗τ u˜,v and τ ′ , τ(X), ρ′ , ρ(X), we have
w(τ ′,Xτ ′) ≤ E[w(ρ
′,Xρ′)|F
s
τ ′ ] P− a.s.
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We omit the definition of Stochastic super-solution of lower Isaacs for the reason of being obvious
by now. Let w a stochastic sub-solution of upper Isaacs. Fix v ∈ V(s, s) and τ = s. There exists
U˜ ∈ U(s, s) (depending on v) such that, for each ρ ∈ Bs we have
w(s, x) ≤ E
[
w(ρ(Xs,x,u˜,v· ),X
s,x,u˜,v
ρ(Xs,x,u˜,v· )
)|Fss
]
, P− a.s
After taking the expectation, it is now obvious that, if w is a stochastic super-solution, then we have
the half DPP/sub-optimality principle for w, i.e.
w(s, x) ≤ inf
v∈V(s,s)
sup
u∈U(s,s)
E
[
w(ρ(Xs,x,u,v· ),X
s,x,u,v
ρ(Xs,x,u,v· )
)
]
, ∀ρ ∈ Bs. (6)
Since w(T, ·) ≤ g(·), we obtain easily that w(s, x) ≤ V +(s, x).
Remark 3.4 The definitions of stochastic semi-solutions are quite different from those in the case
of one player (control problems) in [BS13]. There, one simply starts the problem at a stopping time
sequel to s in the definition(s): the same does not make sense here. Therefore, the nearly optimal
strategy (maybe depending on the other player strategy, as for the sub-solution of upper Isaacs) in
the definition(s) has to be concatenated with any other strategy up to that stopping time rule τ . This
makes sense conceptually as one cannot simply start the game at τ . On the other hand, if we tried to
start the game at a stopping time τ ′ of the original filtration Fs, we would get into significant difficulty
trying to complete Stochastic Perron’s method below. In some sense, this is one of the best features
of Stochastic Perron’s Method, as it allows for great flexibility as to what we can choose for stochastic
semi-solutions, as long as the definitions provide an easy comparison to the value function(s).
We denote by
1. U+ the set of stochastic super-solutions of upper Isaacs
2. U− the set of stochastic sub-solutions of upper Isaacs
3. L+ the set of stochastic super-solutions of lower Isaacs (not defined explicitly)
4. L− the set of stochastic sub-solutions of lower Isaacs.
Since g is bounded, all the sets are obviously non-empty. As expected, by Stochastic Perron’s
Method we mean taking the sup of sub-solutions and/or inf of super-solutions (by which we mean
stochastic semi-solutions):
v− , sup
w∈U−
w ≤ V + ≤ inf
w∈U+
w , v+,
and
w− , sup
w∈L−
w ≤ V − ≤ inf
w∈L+
w , w+.
We can say, without need for any more proof, that w− ≤ V − ≤ V + ≤ v+. We recall the standing
assumptions: g is continuous and bounded, b and σ are continuous on their whole corresponding
domains, locally uniformly Lipschitz in x and have global linear growth in x.
Theorem 3.5 (Stochastic Perron for games) Under the standing assumptions:
1. the function v+ is a bounded upper semi-continuous (USC) viscosity sub-solution of the upper
Isaacs equation and satisfies the Half DPP (5). The function v− is a bounded lower semi-
continuous (LSC) viscosity super-solution of the upper Isaacs equation and satisfies the half
DPP (6).
2. the function w+ is a bounded upper semi-continuous (USC) viscosity sub-solution of the lower
Isaacs equation, and the function w− is a bounded lower semi-continuous (LSC) viscosity super-
solution of the lower Isaacs equation (and they both satisfy the corresponding halves of the DPP
for the lower equation).
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Remark 3.6 The viscosity semi-solution property holds at time t = 0 as well, consistent with the
notation in (2). This is important (as can be seen from Lemma 4.3) to obtain comparison up to time
t = 0 for semi-continuous viscosity solutions.
In order to prove the Theorem, we need two Lemmas.
Lemma 3.7 1. if w1, w2 ∈ U
+ then w1 ∧ w2 ∈ U
+
2. if w1, w2 ∈ U
− then w1 ∨ w2 ∈ U
−
Fix τ ∈ Bs a stopping time strategy and. Let v˜1, v˜2 ∈ V(s, τ) be the two strategies, for the second
player, starting at τ corresponding the the super-solutions w1 and w2. The new strategy starting at
τ defined by
v˜(t, y(·)) = v˜1(t, y(·)) 1{w1(τ(y),y(τ(y)))≤w2(τ(y),y(τ(y)))} + v˜2(t, y(·)) 1{w1(τ(y),y(τ(y)))>w2(τ(y),y(τ(y)))}
does the job for the definition of w , w1 ∧ w2 as a stochastic super-solution of the upper Isaacs. A
similar construction has to be made for the second part. ⋄
Lemma 3.8 There exists a non-increasing sequence U+ ∋ wn ց v
+ and an non-decreasing sequence
U− ∋ vn ր v
−.
Proof: according to Proposition 4.1 in [BS12], there exist w˜n ∈ U
+ such that v+ = infn w˜n. Now, we
can just define wn = w˜1 ∧ · · · ∧ w˜n ∈ U
+ ց v+. A very similar proof works for the second part of the
lemma. ⋄
Proof of Theorem 3.5: the proof of the half DPP is obvious, by construction, since we have seen that
the stochastic semi-solution satisfy such half DPP. As far as the viscosity property is concerned, we
only prove item 1, as the second is obviously symmetric.
1. ( v+ is viscosity sub-solution of upper Isaacs)
1.1: The interior sub-solution property for v+: Let (t0, x0) in the parabolic interior [0, T ) × R
d
such that a smooth function ϕ strictly touches v+ from above at (t0, x0). Assume, by contradiction,
that
ϕt +H
+(t, x, ϕx, ϕxx) < 0 at (t0, x0).
In particular, there exists vˆ ∈ V and ε > 0 such that
ϕt(t0, x0) + sup
u∈U
[
b(t0, x0, u, vˆ) · ϕx(t0, x0) +
1
2
Tr(σ(t0, x0, u, vˆ)σ(t, x, u, vˆ)
Tϕxx(t0, x0))
]
< −ε.
To simplify notation, all small balls here are actually included in (i.e. intersected with) the parabolic
interior. Since b, σ are continuous, and U is compact, the uniform continuity of the above expression
in (t, x, u) for (t, x) around (t0, x0) implies that there exists a smaller ε > 0 such that
ϕt(t, x) + sup
u∈U
[
b(t, x, u, vˆ) · ϕx(t, x) +
1
2
Tr(σ(t, x, u, vˆ)σ(t, x, u, vˆ)Tϕxx(t, x))
]
< −ε, on B(t0, x0, ε).
Now, on the compact (rectangular) torus T = B(t0, x0, ε) − B(t0, x0, ε/2) we have that ϕ > v
+ and
the min of ϕ − v+ is attained, therefore it is strictly positive. In other words ϕ > v+ + η on T for
some η > 0. Since wn ց v
+, a Dini type argument similar to [BS14] and [BS13] shows that, for n
large enough we have ϕ > wn + η/2. For simplicity, fix such an n and call w = wn. Now, define, for
small δ << η/2
wδ ,
{
(ϕ− δ) ∧ w on B(t0, x0, ε),
w outside B(t0, x0, ε).
Since wδ(t0, x0) < v
+(t0, x0), we obtain a contradiction if we can show w
δ ∈ U+.
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In order to do so, fix s and let τ ∈ Bs be a stopping rule for the initial time s. We need to construct
an elementary strategy v˜ ∈ V(s, τ) in the Definition of stochastic super-solution for wδ . This can be
done as follows: since w is a stochastic super-solution of upper Isaacs, there exists an elementary
strategy v˜1 for w starting at τ that does the job. Then
1. if (ϕ− δ) < w at τ , follow the constant action vˆ.
2. if (ϕ− δ) ≥ w at (τ, ξ) follow the strategy v˜1
3. follow the strategy defined in 1-2 until the first time τ1 when (t,Xt) ∈ ∂B(t0, x0, ε/2). On this
boundary, we know that wδ = w.
4. after this, follow the strategy v˜3 ∈ V(s, τ1) corresponding to the stochastic sub-solution w with
starting stopping rule τ1
In a rigorous notation though, we first define v˜2 ∈ V(s, τ) by
v˜2(t, y(·)) = vˆ 1{ϕ(τ(y),y(τ(y)))−δ<w(τ(y),y(τ (y)))} + v˜1(t, y(·)) 1{ϕ(τ(y),y(τ(y)))−δ≥w(τ (y),y(τ(y)))} .
Denote now by τ1 : C([s, T ])→ [s, T ], τ ≤ τ1 ≤ T ,
τ1(y) , inf
τ(y)≤t≤T
{(t, y(t)) ∈ ∂B(t0, x0, ε/2)}.
Now, if v˜3 ∈ V(s, τ1) is the strategy from the definition of the stochastic super-solution w, correspond-
ing to stopping rule τ1, then we can define
v˜ = v˜2 ⊗τ1 v˜3 ∈ V(s, τ)
to finish the proof. In order to check that v˜ fulfills the condition in the definition of stochastic super-
solution for upper Isaacs, one has to follow similar arguments to the proofs in [BS13], based on Itoˆ’s
Lemma applied to d(ϕ − δ)(t,Xt), conditioning and the tower property. However, one has to shift
attention from stopping times as in [BS13] to stopping rules. We present the arguments in what
follows. Fix u ∈ U(s, s) , v ∈ V(s, s), x ∈ Rd and choose a stopping rule ρ ∈ Bs with τ ≤ ρ ≤ T .
Denote by X , Xs,x,u,v⊗τ v˜ , where v˜ was just defined above and τ ′ , τ(X), ρ′ , ρ(X). Let also
τ ′1 , τ1(X) such that τ
′ ≤ τ ′1 ≤ ρ
′, and define the event A , {(ϕ − δ)(τ ′,Xτ ′) < w(τ
′,Xτ ′)}. We first
observe that
Xt = 1AX
s,x,u,v⊗τ vˆ
t + 1AcX
s,x,u,v⊗τ v˜1
t , τ
′ ≤ t ≤ τ ′1.
On A, the process (ϕ−δ)(·,X·) then satisfies the super-martingale property in between τ
′ and τ ′1 from
Itoˆ’s Lemma. On Ac, the process w(·,X·) satisfies the super-martingale inequality in between τ
′ and
τ ′1 from the definition of the strategy v˜1 ∈ V(s, τ). Putting this together, we have
wδ(τ ′,Xτ ′) ≥ E[w
δ(τ ′1,Xτ ′1)|F
s
τ ′ ] P− a.s.
Now, using the fact that v˜3 ∈ V(s, τ1) provides a super-martingale inequality concatenated with any
previous strategy v and against any strategy u of the opponent, we have
wδ(τ ′1,Xτ ′1) = w(τ
′
1,Xτ ′1) ≥ E[w(ρ
′,Xρ′)|F
s
τ ′
1
] ≥ E[wδ(ρ′,Xρ′)|F
s
τ ′
1
] P− a.s.
The iterating conditioning provides wδ(τ ′,Xτ ′) ≥ E[w
δ(ρ′,Xρ′)|F
s
τ ′ ] P− a.s. This means w
δ ∈ U+, so
we reached a contradiction.
1.2. The terminal condition property for v+: the proof is quite similar to the proof of 1.1. More
precisely, first we argue by contradiction, similar to either above or to [BS13] (but easier since controls
are compact), then we construct a strategy v˜ as above. Finally, we follow the arguments above based
on Itoˆ’s Lemma and conditioning, to finish the proof. We develop these ideas below.
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Assume that, for some x0 ∈ R
d we have v+(T, x0) > g(x0). Since g is USC , there exists an ε > 0
such that g(x) ≤ v+(T, x0)− ε if |(t, x)− (T, x0)| , max{|x− x0|, T − t} ≤ ε. Denote, once again, by
T , B(T, x0, ε)−B(T, x0, ε/2)) ∩ ([0, T ]× R
d).
Now v+ is USC so bounded on T. Choose η > 0 small enough so that
v+(T, x0) +
ε2
4η
> ε+ sup
(t,x)∈T
v+(t, x).
Since the inequality above is strict, we use again a decreasing sequence and a Dini argument from
[BS14] to find some w ∈ V+ such that
v+(T, x0) +
ε2
4η
> ε+ sup
(t,x)∈T
w(t, x). (7)
We now define, for k > 0 the following function
ϕη,ε,k(t, x) = v+(T, x0) +
|x− x0|
2
η
+ k(T − t).
Since U , V are compact and b, σ are continuous, for some k large enough (but no smaller than ε/2η),
we have that
−ϕε,η,kt −H
+(t, x, ϕε,η,kx , ϕ
ε,η,k
xx ) > 0 on B(T, x0, ε).
From (7) we obtain ϕε,η,k ≥ ε+ w on T. Also,
ϕε,η,k(T, x) ≥ v+(T, x0) ≥ g(x) + ε for |x− x0| ≤ ε.
We now choose δ < ε and define
vε,η,k,δ =
{
w ∧
(
ϕε,η,k − δ
)
on B(T, x0, ε),
w outside B(T, x0, ε).
Using again the ideas in part 1.1 of the proof, we can show that vε,η,k,δ ∈ U+ but vε,η,k,δ(T, x0) =
v+(T, x0)− δ < v
+(T, x0), leading to a contradiction. Therefore, v
+(T, ·) ≤ g.
2. v− is viscosity super-solution of upper Isaacs
2. 1. The interior super-solution property for v−: Let (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )×R
d in the parabolic interior
such that a smooth function ϕ strictly touches v− from below at (t0, x0). Assume, by contradiction,
that ϕt+H
+(t, x, ϕx, ϕxx) > 0 at (t0, x0). There exists a ε > 0 and there exists a measurable function
h : V → U, such that
ϕt(t0, x0) +
[
b(t0, x0, h(v), v) · ϕx(t0, x0) +
1
2
Tr(σ(t0, x0, h(v), v)σ(t0 , x0, h(v), v)
Tϕxx(t0, x0))
]
> ε.
In order to construct the function h above, one does not need to use measurable selection arguments.
Using uniform continuity on balls, one can actually choose a finitely valued h. Since ϕt + b · ϕx +
1
2Tr(σσ
Tϕxx) is continuous in (t, x, u, v) and U, V are compact, it is therefore uniformly continuous
on C × U × V , where C is any compact neighborhood of (t0, x0). Therefore, we can choose a smaller
ε > 0 such that (despite the fact that h is only measurable, and maybe not continuous)
ϕt(t, x)+
[
b(t, x, h(v), v) · ϕx(t, x) +
1
2
Tr(σ(t, x, h(v), v)σ(t, x, h(v), v)T ϕxx(t, x))
]
> ε, on B(t0, x0, ε)×V.
To be precise, small balls here are again intersected with the parabolic interior [0, T ) × Rd. On the
compact torus T = B(t0, x0, ε)−B(t0, x0, ε/2) we have that ϕ < v
− and the max of ϕ−v− is attained,
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therefore it is strictly negative. In other words ϕ+η < v− on T for some η > 0. Since we can construct
an increasing sequence of stochastic sub-solutions wn ր v
−, the same Dini type argument similar to
[BS14] and [BS13] shows that, for n large enough we have ϕ+ η/2 < wn on T. For simplicity, fix such
an n and call w = wn. Now, define, for small δ << η/2
wδ ,
{
(ϕ+ δ) ∨ w on B(t0, x0, ε),
w outside B(t0, x0, ε).
Since wδ(t0, x0) > v
+(t0, x0), we obtain a contradiction if we can show w
δ ∈ U−. In order to do so, fix
s and let τ : C([s, T ])→ [s, T ] be a stopping time strategy for the initial time s. Fix also v ∈ V(s, s).
We need to construct an elementary strategy u˜ ∈ U(s, τ) in the Definition of stochastic sub-solutions
for wδ, depending on the v we just fixed. This can be again done as follows: since w is a stochastic
sub-solution of upper Isaacs, there exists an elementary strategy u˜1 for w starting at τ and depending
on v that does the job. Then
1. if ϕ+ δ > w at τ , follow the constant action h(v).
2. if w ≥ ϕ+ δ at τ follow the strategy u˜1
3. follow the strategy in 1-2 until the first time τ1 when (t,Xt) ∈ ∂B(t0, x0, ε/2). On this boundary,
wδ = w
4. after this, follow the strategy u˜3 ∈ U(s, τ1) corresponding to the stochastic sub-solution w with
starting stopping rule τ1 and second player’s strategy v ∈ V(s, s).
In a rigorous notation though, we first define u˜2 ∈ U(s, τ) by
u˜2(t, y(·)) = h(v(t, y(·)) 1{ϕ(τ(y),y(τ(y)))+δ>w(τ(y),y(τ(y)))} + u˜1(t, y(·)) 1{ϕ(τ(y),y(τ(y)))+δ≤w(τ(y),y(τ (y)))} .
The key observation here, is that, since h simply maps V into U , then, indeed, u˜2 is an elementary
strategy u˜2 ∈ U(s, τ). Denote now by τ1 : C([s, T ])→ [s, T ], τ ≤ τ1 ≤ T ,
τ1(y) = inf
τ(y)≤t≤T
{(t, y(t)) ∈ ∂B(t0, x0, ε/2)}.
Now, if u˜3 ∈ U(s, τ1) is the strategy defining the stochastic super-solution w, corresponding to v ∈
V(s, s) then we can define
u˜ = u˜2 ⊗τ1 u˜3 ∈ U(s, τ)
to finish the proof. To actually check that u˜ (depending on v and τ) fulfills the condition in the
definition of stochastic sub-solution for upper Isaacs, one has to follow similar arguments to the above
part 1.1 of the proof, based on Itoˆ’s Lemma applied to d(ϕ+ δ)(t,Xt), together with conditioning.
2.2. The terminal condition property for v−: the proof is similar to the part 2.1 of the proof, but
with an analytic construction very similar to the terminal condition part 1.2. More precisely, first we
argue by contradiction, similar to the above step 1.2, then we construct a strategy u˜ as in 2.1 above
depending on the fixed v and τ . Finally, we once again use on Itoˆ’s Lemma and conditioning in a
similar manner to finish the proof.
4 Verification by Comparison and Dynamic Programming Principle
Theorem 4.1 Under the standing assumptions, we have
1. v− = V + = v+ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the upper Isaacs equation. In
addition, the upper value V + satisfies the (DPP)
V +(s, x) = inf
v∈V(s,s)
sup
u∈U(s,s)
E
[
V +(ρ(Xs,x,u,v· ),X
s,x,u,v
ρ(Xs,x,u,v· )
]
, ∀ρ ∈ Bs.
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2. w− = V − = w+ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the lower Isaacs equation. In
addition, the lower value V − satisfies the (DPP)
V −(s, x) = sup
u∈U(s,s)
inf
v∈V(s,s)
E
[
V −(ρ(Xs,x,u,v· ),X
s,x,u,v
ρ(Xs,x,u,v· )
]
, ∀ρ ∈ Bs.
If the Isaacs condition H− = H+ holds then the game has a value and the value
w− = V − = V = V + = v+
is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the (unified) Isaacs equation. For each ε > 0, there exist
ε-saddle point strategies (u, v) ∈ U(s, s)× V(s, s).
We note that the DPP is a statement about stopping rules ρ ∈ Bs and is not formulated with
respect to stopping times ρ′ on the original probability space (Ω,F ,Fs,P).
Remark 4.2 In case the Isaacs condition holds, then one only needs to prove half of the Theorem 3.5
(and arguably the easier one), namely that v+ is a viscosity sub-solution of the Isaacs equation and
that w− is a super-solution of the very same equation. These statements are perfectly symmetric (and
this is the reason why we skipped completely the proof for w+ and w−). In this case, we already have
that w− ≤ V − ≤ V +− ≤ v+ and the comparison argument closes the proof (including the DPP).
Proof: the (DPP) is an easy conclusion of the way we defined v+, v−, w+ and w−, since the
stochastic sub/super-solutions of upper/lower Isaacs satisfy the corresponding half DPP. In light of
Theorem 3.5, there is basically nothing left to prove, once a comparison result for bounded semi-
continuous viscosity solutions of the two Isaacs equations is available. We make it available below to
conclude ⋄
The following Lemma is basically borrowed from the analysis literature. One can either take it
from [CIL92] (with modifications to allow for unbounded domains, bounded semi-continuous solutions
and comparison up to t = 0) or (but still up to details) from [Pha09].
Lemma 4.3 Assume b, σ are continuous, locally uniformly Lipschitz in x, satisfy linear growth (stand-
ing assumptions) and U , V are compact. Then
1. for each R > 0 there exists some ωR : [0,∞)→ [0,∞), with ωR(0+) = 0 such that for any X,Y
satisfying
− 3α
(
I 0
0 I
)
≤
(
X 0
0 −Y
)
≤ 3α
(
I −I
−I I
)
(8)
we have
Lu,v(t, y, α(x− y), Y )−Lu,v(t, x, α(x− y),X) ≤ ωR(α|x− y|
2+ |x− y|), ∀ t, u, v and |x|, |y| ≤ R
(9)
with the notation Lu,v(t, x, p,M) , −b(t, x, u, v) · p− 12Tr(σ(t, x, u, v)σ
T (t, x, u, v)M)
2. we have that, whenever condition (8) is satisfied,
F (t, y, α(x−y), Y )−F (t, x, α(x−y),X) ≤ ωR(α|x−y|
2+ |x−y|), ∀ t, u, v and |x|, |y| ≤ R (10)
for F = −H+ or F = −H−
3. consider v a bounded USC (on [0, T ]× Rd) viscosity sub-solution of
−vt + F (t, x, vx, vxx) ≤ 0 on [0, T )× R
d
and w a bounded LSC (on [0, T ]× Rd) viscosity super-solution of
−wt + F (t, x, wx, wxx) ≥ 0 on [0, T )× R
d,
where (either) F = −H+ (or F = −H−). If v(T, ·) ≤ w(T, ·) then v ≤ w.
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Proof:
1. condition (9) (denoted by (3.14) in [CIL92]) is actually proved in [CIL92] on page 19, in the
elliptic case (no dependence on t), but the same proof applies to the parabolic case. One should
have in mind that the local Lipschitz constant is uniform in u, v, therefore, the same function
ωR can be chosen to work for all u, v
2. as still mentioned on page 19 in [CIL92], once (9) is uniform in u, v, it applies to any sup inf or
inf sup transformation, obtaining the nonlinear structural condition (10) (called, to recall, (3.14)
in [CIL92]) subject to (8).
3. here, the proof is an adaptation of the comparison result in [CIL92] to the case of an unbounded
domain and (bounded) semi-continuous solutions, under the structural condition (10) subject to
(8) and with the additional important piece of information that coefficients have global linear
growth. Comparison is obtained up to time t = 0, as in [Pha09] or [DFO11]. The case we
have here does not fit perfectly in the existing literature, so that we cannot simply quote a
single theorem, but the sequence of arguments used is well understood in the viscosity solution
literature (see, for example, [DFO11] or [Pha09]. We present the key arguments below.
To summarize, we use the penalization in the text-book [Pha09], taking advantage of the linear
growth of the coefficients and the special structure of the HJB equation to reduce the problem
to a bounded domain, and then appeal to a modification of the results in [CIL92] based on
the arguments in [DFO11] or [Pha09], to obtain comparison up to t = 0 under the structural
condition (3.14) in [CIL92].
Assume, for example, that F = −H+. Let φ(t, x) = e−λt(1 + |x|2). From the linear growth
assumption LG we have
sup
u∈U
sup
v∈V
{|b(t, x, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v)|} ≤ C(1 + |x|), ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Rd.
This means that, for λ > 0 large enough, we have
φt(t, x) + sup
u∈U
sup
v∈V
[b(t, x, u, v) · φx(t, x) +
1
2
Tr(σ(t, x, u, v)σT (t, x, u, v)φxx(t, x))] < 0,
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Rd. Therefore, for any ε > 0, the LSC function wε = w + εφ is (easy
to check) a viscosity super-solution of wεt + H
+(t, x, wεx, w
ε
xx) ≤ 0. According to Theorem 8.2
in [CIL92] (actually the follow up observations on page 52), because F = −H+ satisfies the
structural condition (10) subject to (8), we have, for any bounded open domain O = {|x| <
R} ⊂ Rd, a comparison result after time t = 0
v(t, x) ≤ wε(t, x) + max
(
sup
(0,T ]×∂O
(v − wε)+, sup
{T}×O
(v − wε)+
)
∀ 0 < t ≤ T, x ∈ O.
However, it is well known (for example from [DFO11], or [Pha09]), that, as long as the viscosity
semi-solution property holds at time t = 0 as well (which is the case here), the doubling argument
can be reproduced to provide comparison up to time t = 0, i.e.
v(t, x) ≤ wε(t, x) + max
(
sup
[0,T ]×∂O
(v − wε)+, sup
{T}×O
(v − wε)+
)
∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ O.
If one does not want to use the version of the Theorem of Sums (TOS) in [DFO11] to get
comparison up to t = 0 in the relation above, an alternative way is to simply define the whole
game starting at an earlier negative time. Since both v,w are bounded, the choice of φ ensures
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that, for large enough domain O = {|x| < R} we have sup[0,T ]×∂O(v − w
ε)+ = 0. In addition,
since v(T, ·) ≤ w(T, ·) ≤ wε(T, ·), we conclude that sup{T}×O(v−w
ε)+ = 0 as well. In summary,
for each ε > 0 we have
v(t, x) ≤ w(t, x) + εφ(t, x), ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ T, |x| < R
for any R large enough (depending on ε). We first let Rր∞ and then εց 0 to conclude that
v ≤ w on [0, T ]× Rd.
5 Conclusions
Using Stochastic Perron’s method we show that the values of differential games formulated sym-
metrically over elementary feed-back strategies are (the unique continuous) viscosity solutions of the
corresponding Isaacs equations and the DPP holds. We allow for the state equation to be degener-
ate and time-dependent. Some of the assumptions (for example, compactness of U , V ) seem to be
removable, but one still needs enough to get comparison of semi-continuous viscosity solutions.
The program we propose amounts to verification for non-smooth viscosity solutions for the game
in the original strong definition, and seems rather elementary compared to either the verification
approach in [S´wi96b] or proving (parts of) the DPP working with the value functions as in [FS89],
[Kat95] or [CR09]. We introduce the class of Elementary (feed-back) Strategies, which have strong
intuition behind and are easily amenable to analysis. In particular, a player in a game that is believed
to be continuous in time, is most likely to use Elementary Strategies to approximate the saddle point,
if such exists. Obviously, one does not expect a saddle point to consist of elementary strategies, but,
if the Isaacs condition holds, one has ε-saddle points among elementary strategies. The present work
sets the foundation for the analysis (in [S1ˆ3]) of more realistic zero-sum differential games over mixed
(elementary) feed-back strategies. Such a game always has a value, which is the unique solution of
the (mixed) Isaacs equation.
We believe the present analysis sheds more light on the connection between controlled diffusions
and viscosity solutions of fully non-linear PDE’s. One important observation is that, in this symmetric
formulation of the game over feed-back strategies, the DPP is expected to hold only over stopping
rules, i.e. stopping times where the decision to stop is based upon observing only the state, and not
the noise. The technical parts of the proofs (which are basically elementary) are reminiscent of the
previous proofs in [BS12], [BS14] and especially [BS13], and, for the analytic constructions, resemble
the classic work of Ishii [Ish87]. An important part of the contribution resides in the symmetric
formulation of the game over elementary strategies (and strong solutions of the state equation) and in
the proper (non-trivial) identification of stochastic semi-solutions to the Isaacs equations, that allows
for the Stochastic Perron’s Method to be completed. With this in mind, we reiterate the conjecture
that any stochastic optimization problem could be treated using Stochastic Perron’s Method, provided
that it is properly formulated, and the stochastic semi-solutions defined accordingly.
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